The Flashpoint : The Cuban Missile Crisis

The three-way royal rumble : Kennedy V.S. Khrushchev V.S. Castro

http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/

"OK, Mr. President, let's talk."

http://www.johndclare.net/images/Armwrestling.gif

Who will win in this struggle for power and nuclear superiority?

Background

The Arms Race

In 1945, the US dropped two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, shocking the world. This is when the Arms Race began. The USSR raced with the US to stockpile, test and develop (nuclear) weapons. After that incident, it was quickly followed by the USSR testing their first atomic bomb. The hydrogen bomb came up next, first tested by the US, then by the USSR. Witnessing such a situation, the US began to stockpile H-bombs, while the USSR stockpiled more conventional weapons such as missiles. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) were then developed by both countries, marking a very imminent threat of mutually assured destruction. In the later 1950s, the USSR was circled by US missiles based in Europe. Furthermore, after Khrushchev found out that Eisenhower has sent spy planes to photograph USSR’s ICBMs, the Cold War escalated even more. This stockpiling of nuclear weapons played a major role in the Cuban Missile Crisis, and will be elaborated under the relevant section.

Bay of Pigs Invasion, April 17 – April 19, 1961

Somewhere in Cuba, someone was planning to overthrow the corrupt US government there. That man was Fidel Castro. On 1 January 1959, he seized power in Cuba. He proceeded to nationalize institutions and redistributed land back to the peasants. As such, the richer people in Cuba fled to Miami and Florida, waiting to strike back. The US saw Castro as communist due to his actions. The US began to show hostility towards Cuba, starting with an oil blockade.
Eisenhower broke all relations with Cuba just before Kennedy took over, and also agreed to a CIA plan to assist the exiles to invade Cuba. However, only Kennedy knew of the plan to assassinate Castro. However, these assassination attempts failed, and the exiles were prepared to invade Cuba in April 1961. On 15 April, a bombing run was carried out by the exiles. Their planes were disguised with Cuban airforce insignias. Kennedy approved of this, but denied air support for the actual invasion as he did not want evidence against the US for this illegal act. On 17 April, 1400 exiles landed on the Bay of Pigs for the invasion. The relatively small number was not sufficient for an invasion. The US hoped that this “invasion” would spark civil unrest, leading to a civil war in Cuba itself, and eventually overthrowing Castro. It did not happen. By 19 April, the exiles were crushed by Castro’s force of tanks and aircraft. As such, the Bay of Pigs invasion turned into a fiasco.

The exiles being captured by Castro's forces.

http://cubasocialista.com/Bay2.html

The Cuban Missile Crisis : Foreshadowing

Castro makes a new ally

The actions taken by the US have made Castro realize that they were hostile towards him. As such, he needed to find friends and allies. At this point in time, the USSR seemed to be the most inviting ally. Despite claiming to be nationalist, Castro’s revolution was seen as communist in the eyes of the USSR. Furthermore, both parties had similar ideologies such as nationalizing companies and distributing land to the poor, which promoted their friendship.
Immediately after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Khrushchev quickly suggested measures to assist Cuba. To Khrushchev, Cuba was a very eligible candidate to join the “Communist empire”, which meant that it was an opportunity to spread Communism. Affected under this newly-found friendship, Castro finally declared himself as a communist on 1 May 1961.
The USSR had helped Castro by providing him with intelligence. On 24 June 1961, Castro received intelligence from a Soviet ambassador in Havana about a planned assassination on him. With this information, arrangements could be made in order to protect Castro. In this manner, the USSR had already helped foil part of the US’s “Operation Mongoose”, which included an economic blockade on Cuba, sinking certain Cuban ships importing arms, the sabotage of Cuban oil sites, and the assassination of Castro, which ultimately failed.
Since the USSR had shown to be trustworthy, Castro formally asked the USSR in August 1961 to assist against an US invasion or threat of invasion.

Khrushchev’s Plan : Operation Anadyr

Khrushchev, too, felt that an US invasion was imminent. In fact, Khrushchev thought that Cuba was of great importance to him, as it was part of the communist cause. In May 1962, he discussed the plan of secretly placing nuclear warheads in Cuba with his Defence Minister Malinovsky and Chief of Staff Zakharov. Soon after, in June 1962, the plan was approved by Castro. He codenamed this plan as “Operation Anadyr”. Khrushchev felt that words were not strong enough to deal against the US, and the next available choice would be missiles. He gained confidence in this plan partly from the Bay of Pigs invasion, which showed that Kennedy, being an unconfident man, would accept the missiles in Cuba as a fact that cannot be changed. He was wrong.

US U-2 planes find out about the missiles

On 25 September 1962, the first U-2 spyplanes were sent on reconnaissance missions over Cuba. They reported that Soviet forces were set up there, with 42 nuclear warheads present. In another reconnaissance mission on 14 October, the pictures showed that missile bases and pads were under construction. A day later, reports show that the launch pads are nearing completion. This caused great distress in the US, which was not prepared for such circumstances.

One of the pictures taken, showing the missile sites in a star-shaped pattern.

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/5.jpg

The Cuban Missile Crisis : The Thirteen Days of True Crisis

Kennedy’s response after knowing about the missiles

On 16 October, Kennedy got wind of the reconnaissance pictures. On that very same day, he assembled the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (EXCOMM), comprised of fourteen officials and his brother, Robert Kennedy. Through discussions, the EXCOMM proposed five possible responses to Kennedy, namely :

1. Do nothing.
2. Persuade the USSR to remove the missiles via diplomatic pressure.
3. Conduct an airstrike on the missiles, missile bases and launch pads.
4. Conduct a full-scale military invasion.
5. Conduct a naval blockade on Cuba, later redefined as “selective quarantine”.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously voted for either the invasion of the air strike. Kennedy disregarded both these possibilities, claiming that if the US did so, “the United States' allies would think of the U.S. as "trigger-happy cowboys" who lost Berlin because they could not peacefully resolve the Cuban situation.” Finally on 18 October, Robert McNamara suggested that a blockade or quarantine should be carried out instead, reason being that this was a powerful move that gave the US control over Cuba, while maintaining little, if not no contact with the Soviets.

Kennedy informs the US citizens of the current situation

Even after the decision of the US response has been made, the Joint Chiefs of Staff still believe that the bombing of the missile bases was the most viable option. However, on 22 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are unable to guarantee the destruction of all the missile sites, and hence the idea was scrapped. At 7:00 pm on the same day, Kennedy made a public speech over the radio informing the people of the nuclear crisis. He also tells the people that the US has decided to employ option of the naval blockade. The quarantine is applied to all Soviet ships and ships from the countries under the Warsaw pact that are sailing to Cuba. US forces were also informed of the DEFCON 3 (Defence Readiness Condition) status. On 23 October, the ships set out to Cuba, and the blockade was formed.

A US P-52 Neptune flying over a Soviet freighter

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:P-2H_Neptune_over_Soviet_ship_Oct_1962.jpg

A link to Kennedy’s address to the public :
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:John_F_Kennedy_Address_on_the_Buildup_of_Arms_in_Cuba.ogg
Khrushchev’s first message

At 11:24 am on 23 October, Kennedy was informed by George Ball, an American diplomat, that the USSR was considering to remove the Cuban missiles if the US were to remove its Jupiter Missiles in Italy and Turkey. The information proved true. On 24 October, 9:24pm, Khrushchev sent a telegram to Kennedy regarding the negotiations.

----------Start of Message----------

Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, October 24, 1962
Moscow, October 24, 1962.

Dear Mr. President:

I have received your letter of October 23, have studied it, and am answering you.
Just imagine, Mr. President, that we had presented you with the conditions of an ultimatum which you have presented us by your action. How would you have reacted to this? I think that you would have been indignant at such a step on our part. And this would have been understandable to us.

In presenting us with these conditions, you, Mr. President, have flung a challenge at us. Who asked you to do this? By what right did you do this? Our ties with the Republic of Cuba, like our relations with other states, regardless of what kind of states they may be, concern only the two countries between which these relations exist. And if we now speak of the quarantine to which your letter refers, a quarantine may be established, according to accepted international practice, only by agreement of states between themselves, and not by some third party. Quarantines exist, for example, on agricultural goods and products. But in this case the question is in no way one of quarantine, but rather of far more serious things, and you yourself understand this.

You, Mr. President, are not declaring a quarantine, but rather are setting forth an ultimatum and threatening that if we do not give in to your demands you will use force. Consider what you are saying! And you want to persuade me to agree to this! What would it mean to agree to these demands? It would mean guiding oneself in one's relations with other countries not by reason, but by submitting to arbitrariness. You are no longer appealing to reason, but wish to intimidate us.

No, Mr. President, I cannot agree to this, and I think that in your own heart you recognize that I am correct. I am convinced that in my place you would act the same way.
Reference to the decision of the Organization of American States cannot in any way substantiate the demands now advanced by the United States. This Organization has absolutely no authority or basis for adopting decisions such as the one you speak of in your letter. Therefore, we do not recognize these decisions. International law exists and universally recognized norms of conduct exist. We firmly adhere to the principles of international law and observe strictly the norms which regulate navigation on the high seas, in international waters. We observe these norms and enjoy the rights recognized by all states.

You wish to compel us to renounce the rights that every sovereign state enjoys, you are trying to legislate in questions of international law, and you are violating the universally accepted norms of that law. And you are doing all this not only out of hatred for the Cuban people and its government, but also because of considerations of the election campaign in the United States. What morality, what law can justify such an approach by the American Government to international affairs? No such morality or law can be found, because the actions of the United States with regard to Cuba constitute outright banditry or, if you like, the folly of degenerate imperialism. Unfortunately, such folly can bring grave suffering to the peoples of all countries, and to no lesser degree to the American people themselves, since the United States has completely lost its former isolation with the advent of modern types of armament.

Therefore, Mr. President, if you coolly weigh the situation which has developed, not giving way to passions, you will understand that the Soviet Union cannot fail to reject the arbitrary demands of the United States. When you confront us with such conditions, try to put yourself in our place and consider how the United States would react to these conditions. I do not doubt that if someone attempted to dictate similar conditions to you--the United States--you would reject such an attempt. And we also say--no.

The Soviet Government considers that the violation of the freedom to use international waters and international air space is an act of aggression which pushes mankind toward the abyss of a world nuclear-missile war. Therefore, the Soviet Government cannot instruct the captains of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba to observe the orders of American naval forces blockading that Island. Our instructions to Soviet mariners are to observe strictly the universally accepted norms of navigation in international waters and not to retreat one step from them. And if the American side violates these rules, it must realize what responsibility will rest upon it in that case. Naturally we will not simply be bystanders with regard to piratical acts by American ships on the high seas. We will then be forced on our part to take the measures we consider necessary and adequate in order to protect our rights. We have everything necessary to do so.

Respectfully,

N. Khrushchev

----------End of Message----------

As stated : "If you coolly weigh the situation which has developed, not giving way to passions, you will understand that the Soviet Union cannot fail to reject the arbitrary demands of the United States."

The telegram also stated that the USSR viewed the blockade as an act of aggression, and their ships were ordered to ignore the blockade. The next day, at 1:45am, Kennedy replied to Khrushchev’s telegram, stating that the US was forced into the blockade since evidences have shown the there were offensive missiles placed on Cuba.

----------Start of Message----------

Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev, October 25, 1962
October 25, 1962

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have received your letter of October 24, and I regret very much that you still do not appear to understand what it is that has moved us in this matter.

The sequence of events is clear. In August there were reports of important shipments of military equipment and technicians from the Soviet Union to Cuba. In early September I indicated very plainly that the United States would regard any shipment of offensive weapons as presenting the gravest issues. After that time, this Government received the most explicit assurances from your Government and its representatives, both publicly and privately, that no offensive weapons were being sent to Cuba. If you will review the statement issued by Tass in September, you will see how clearly this assurance was given.

In reliance on these solemn assurances I urged restraint upon those in this country who were urging action in this matter at that time. And then I learned beyond doubt what you have not denied -- namely, that all these public assurances were false and that your military people had set out recently to establish a set of missile bases in Cuba. I ask you to recognize clearly, Mr. Chairman, that it was not I who issued the first challenge in this case, and that in the light of this record these activities in Cuba required the responses I have announced.

I repeat my regret that these events should cause a deterioration in our relations. I hope that your Government will take the necessary action to permit a restoration of the earlier situation.

Sincerely yours,
John F. Kennedy

----------End of Message----------

The naval blockade was more of a selective one. At 7:15 am on 25 October, the Bucharest approached the blockade. Since it did not contain any arms, it was allowed through. Another Soviet oil tanker was also allowed through. At this point in time, the crisis seemed to be at a stalemate. Kennedy was tempted to conduct the invasion to remove the Cuban missiles, but the EXCOMM persuaded him against doing so.

Secret (unpublicized) negotiations

On 26 October 1:00 pm, Aleksandr Fomin, the KGB Station Chief in the US, met up with John Scali from ABC News. Fomin suggested a deal : The Soviet Union would remove the missiles, Castro would announce that he would not accept any more nuclear weapons, and the US would announce that it would never invade Cuba. Scali passed this message to the US government, who responded by asking the Brazillian government to inform Castro that an invasion would be unlikely should the missiles be removed. At 6:00 pm, Khrushchev replied to the State Department with a telegram, stating :

"I propose: we, for our part, will declare that our ships bound for Cuba are not carrying any armaments. You will declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its troops and will not support any other forces which might intend to invade Cuba. Then the necessity of the presence of our military specialists in Cuba will disappear."

This formed the basis for the final agreement later on.

Khrushchev’s second message

At 9:00 am on 27 October, Radio Moscow (USSR’s radio station) broadcasted a new message from Khrushchev, different from the one that he wrote yesterday. He offered that the Cuban missiles would be removed if the US Jupiter missiles in Italy and Turkey were removed. At 11:03 am, the US government received a message from Khrushchev.

------------Start of Message----------

Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, October 27, 1962
Department of StateDivision of Language Services(Translation)
LS NO. 46236T-94/T-24Russian
Embossed Seal of the USSR
J. Kennedy, President of the United States

Copy to U Thant, Acting Secretary General of the U.N.

Dear Mr. President,

I have studied with great satisfaction your reply to Mr. Thant concerning measures that should be taken to avoid contact between our vessels and thereby avoid irreparable and fatal consequences. This reasonable step on your part strengthens my belief that you are showing concern for the preservation of peace, which I note with satisfaction.

I have already said that our people, our Government, and I personally, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, are concerned solely with having our country develop and occupy a worthy place among all peoples of the world in economic competition, in the development of culture and the arts, and in raising the living standard of the people. This is the most noble and necessary field for competition, and both the victor and the vanquished will derive only benefit from it, because it means peace and an increase in the means by which man lives and finds enjoyment.

In your statement you expressed the opinion that the main aim was not simply to come to an agreement and take measures to prevent contact between our vessels and consequently a deepening of the crisis which could, as a result of such contacts spark a military conflict, after which all negotiations would be superfluous because other forces and other laws would then come into play--the laws of war. I agree with you that this is only the first step. The main thing that must be done is to normalize and stabilize the state of peace among states and among peoples.

I understand your concern for the security of the United States, Mr. President, because this is the primary duty of a President. But we too are disturbed about these same questions; I bear these same obligations as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. You have been alarmed by the fact that we have aided Cuba with weapons, in order to strengthen its defense capability--precisely defense capability--because whatever weapons it may possess, Cuba cannot be equated with you since the difference in magnitude is so great, particularly in view of modern means of destruction. Our aim has been and is to help Cuba, and no one can dispute the humanity of our motives, which are oriented toward enabling Cuba to live peacefully and develop in the way its people desire.

You wish to ensure the security of your country, and this is understandable. But Cuba, too, wants the same thing; all countries want to maintain their security. But how are we, the Soviet Union, our Government, to assess your actions which are expressed in the fact that you have surrounded the Soviet Union with military bases; surrounded our allies with military bases; placed military bases literally around our country; and stationed your missile armaments there? This is no secret. Responsible American personages openly declare that it is so. Your missiles are located in Britain, are located in Italy, and are aimed against us. Your missiles are located in Turkey.

You are disturbed over Cuba. You say that this disturbs you because it is 90 miles by sea from the coast of the United States of America. But Turkey adjoins us; our sentries patrol back and forth and see each other. Do you consider, then, that you have the right to demand security for your own country and the removal of the weapons you call offensive, but do not accord the same right to us? You have placed destructive missile weapons, which you call offensive, in Turkey, literally next to us. How then can recognition of our equal military capacities be reconciled with such unequal relations between our great states? This is irreconcilable.

It is good, Mr. President, that you have agreed to have our represent-atives [sic] meet and begin talks, apparently through the mediation of U Thant, Acting Secretary General of the United Nations. Consequently, he to some degree has assumed the role of a mediator and we consider that he will be able to cope with this responsible mission, provided, of course, that each party drawn into this controversy displays good will.

I think it would be possible to end the controversy quickly and normalize the situation, and then the people could breathe more easily, considering that statesmen charged with responsibility are of sober mind and have an awareness of their responsibility combined with the ability to solve complex questions and not bring things to a military catastrophe.

I therefore make this proposal: We are willing to remove from Cuba the means which you regard as offensive. We are willing to carry this out and to make this pledge in the United Nations. Your representatives will make a declaration to the effect that the United States, for its part, considering the uneasiness and anxiety of the Soviet State, will remove its analogous means from Turkey. Let us reach agreement as to the period of time needed by you and by us to bring this about. And, after that, persons entrusted by the United Nations Security Council could inspect on the spot the fulfillment of the pledges made. Of course, the permission of the Governments of Cuba and Turkey is necessary for the entry into those countries of these representatives and for the inspection of the fulfillment of the pledge made by each side. Of course it would be best if these representatives enjoyed the confidence of the Security Council as well as yours and mine--both the United States and the Soviet Union--and also that of Turkey and Cuba. I do not think it would be difficult to select people who would enjoy the trust and respect of all parties concerned.

We, in making this pledge, in order to give satisfaction and hope of the peoples of Cuba and Turkey and to strengthen their confidences in their security, will make a statement within the framework of the Security Council to the effect that the Soviet Government gives a solemn promise to respect the inviolability of the borders and sovereignty of Turkey, not to interfere in its internal affairs, not to invade Turkey, not to make available our territory as a bridgehead for such an invasion, and that it would also restrain those who contemplate committing aggression against Turkey, either from the territory of the Soviet Union or from the territory of Turkey's other neighboring states.

The United States Government will make a similar statement within the framework of the Security Council regarding Cuba. It will declare that the United States will respect the inviolability of Cuba's borders and its sovereignty, will pledge not to interfere in its internal affairs, not to invade Cuba itself or make its territory available as a bridgehead for such an invasion, and will also restrain those who might contemplate committing aggression against Cuba, either from the territory of the United States or from the territory of Cuba's other neighboring states.

Of course, for this we would have to come to an agreement with you and specify a certain time limit. Let us agree to some period of time, but without unnecessary delay--say within two or three weeks, not longer than a month.

The means situated in Cuba, of which you speak and which disturb you, as you have stated, are in the hands of Soviet officers. Therefore, any accidental use of them to the detriment of the United States is excluded. These means are situated in Cuba at the request of the Cuban Government and are only for defense purposes. Therefore, if there is no invasion of Cuba, or attack on the Soviet Union or any of our other allies, then of course these means are not and will not be a threat to anyone. For they are not for purposes of attack.

If you are agreeable to my proposal, Mr. President, then we would send our representatives to New York, to the United Nations, and would give them comprehensive instructions in order that an agreement may be reached more quickly. If you also select your people and give them the corresponding instructions, then this question can be quickly resolved.

Why would I like to do this? Because the whole world is now apprehensive and expects sensible actions of us. The greatest joy for all peoples would be the announcement of our agreement and of the eradication of the controversy that has arisen. I attach great importance to this agreement in so far as it could serve as a good beginning and could in particular make it easier to reach agreement on banning nuclear weapons tests. The question of the tests could be solved in parallel fashion, without connecting one with the other, because these are different issues. However, it is important that agreement be reached on both these issues so as to present humanity with a fine gift, and also to gladden it with the news that agreement has been reached on the cessation of nuclear tests and that consequently the atmosphere will no longer be poisoned. Our position and yours on this issue are very close together.

All of this could possibly serve as a good impetus toward the finding of mutually acceptable agreements on other controversial issues on which you and I have been exchanging views. These issues have so far not been resolved, but they are awaiting urgent solution, which would clear up the international atmosphere. We are prepared for this.

These are my proposals, Mr. President.

Respectfully yours,
[s] N. KhrushchevN. Khrushchev
October 27, 1962

----------End of Message----------

It states that :
"You are disturbed over Cuba. You say that this disturbs you because it is ninety miles by sea from the coast of the United States of America. But... you have placed destructive missile weapons, which you call offensive, in Italy and Turkey, literally next to us... I therefore make this proposal: We are willing to remove from Cuba the means which you regard as offensive... Your representatives will make a declaration to the effect that the United States ... will remove its analogous means from Turkey ... and after that, persons entrusted by the United Nations Security Council could inspect on the spot the fulfillment of the pledges made."

At 12:00 pm, a U-2 was shot down by a surface to air missile over Cuba, and its pilot was killed.

The U-2 as it was back in 1962.

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/1.jpg

The engine of the U-2 that was shot down, displayed in the Museum of Revolution in Havana.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Engine_u2.jpg

A S-75 Dvina with missile loaded. This SAM (surface to air missile) is similar to the one that shot down the U-2.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:S-75_Dzwina_RB2.jpg

At 3:41 pm, several U-2s took fire from Cuba, and one of them was hit but managed to return to base. This placed much stress on the relationship between the US and USSR. Kennedy knew that a resolution must quickly be written in order to prevent a nuclear war from erupting.

Kennedy’s resolution

On 28 October, diplomats sent from both Kennedy and Khrushchev met up to discuss about the solution to the crisis. Kennedy was advised to ignore the harsher and more aggressive demands of the second message, and only reply to the first one. A draft was written, edited and then sent by Kennedy to Khrushchev.

----------Start of Message----------

Telegram of President Kennedy's Reply to Chairman Khrushchev's Letter of October 26, 1962
Washington, October 27, 1962, 8:05 p.m.
1015. Following message from President to Khrushchev should be delivered as soon as possible to highest available Soviet official. Text has been handed Soviet Embassy in Washington and has been released to press:

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have read your letter of October 26th with great care and welcomed the statement of your desire to seek a prompt solution to the problem. The first thing that needs to be done, however, is for work to cease on offensive missile bases in Cuba and for all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use to be rendered inoperable, under effective United Nations arrangements.

Assuming this is done promptly, I have given my representatives in New York instructions that will permit them to work out this weekend--in cooperation with the Acting Secretary General and your representative--an arrangement for a permanent solution to the Cuban problem along the lines suggested in your letter of October 26th. As I read your letter, the key elements of your proposals--which seem generally acceptable as I understand them--are as follows:

1) You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.

2) We, on our part, would agree--upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments--(a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba. I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.

If you will give your representative similar instructions, there is no reason why we should not be able to complete these arrangements and announce them to the world within a couple of days. The effect of such a settlement on easing world tensions would enable us to work toward a more general arrangement regarding 'other armaments', as proposed in your second letter which you made public./2/ I would like to say again that the United States is very much interested in reducing tensions and halting the arms race; and if your letter signifies that you are prepared to discuss a detente affecting NATO and the Warsaw Pact, we are quite prepared to consider with our allies any useful proposals.

But the first ingredient, let me emphasize, is the cessation of work on missile sites in Cuba and measures to render such weapons inoperable, under effective international guarantees. The continuation of this threat, or a prolonging of this discussion concerning Cuba by linking these problems to the broader questions of European and world security, would surely lead to an intensification of the Cuban crisis and a grave risk to the peace of the world. For this reason I hope we can quickly agree along the lines in this letter and in your letter of October 26th.

/s/ John F. Kennedy"
Rusk

----------End of Message----------

Important points of the message were as follows :

"As I read your letter, the key elements of your proposals—which seem generally acceptable as I understand them—are as follows: 1) You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safe-guards, to halt the further introduction of such weapon systems into Cuba. 2) We, on our part, would agree—upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations, to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments (a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against the invasion of Cuba."

Later on in the day, Fomin and Scali met again. Scali became suspicious of the fact that the first and second message from Khrushchev was drastically different. Fomin blamed it on “poor communications”, but Scali accused that it was a double-cross and betrayal. Scali claimed that an invasion on Cuba was imminent, and at that point Fomin stated that Khrushchev’s reply would arrive soon, and assured him that there was no treachery involved.

It turned out that the letter was only received by Khrushchev at 8:05 pm.

There was much discussion between Kennedy’s cabinet and Khrushchev’s. Finally, an agreement was reached : The USSR was to dismantle and remove its missiles in Cuba, while the US was not to invade Cuba. The US also secretly dismantled the missiles in Italy and Turkey. Cuba remained a free state.

The Cuban Missile Crisis had finally ended.

Aftermath


Khrushchev was thoroughly embarrassed. The removal of US missiles in Italy and Turkey was secret; they were not made known to the public. As such, it seemed like the USSR failed to finish what it had started in the first place – influence Cuba to join the communist empire. The circumstances that they themselves had started – the placement of missiles in Cuba to defend against a US invasion – were retreated. Khrushchev lost the trust of the people, and hence lost power for two years.

Kennedy gained much respect through the Cuban Missile Crisis. Despite being young and inexperienced, he has proven himself to be an efficient negotiator, as seen in the negotiations with Khrushchev, an experienced verteran. He has also been shown to make good decision, which eventually averted a nuclear war, solving the crisis.

Castro thought that the Soviets had partially betrayed him. They promised to protect him against an US invasion by using their missiles, but they were dismantled in the end. Cuban – Soviet relations were bad for years. However, Cuba was still protected from an US invasion in the agreement.

Major Rudolf Anderson, the pilot of the U-2 that was shot down, had his body returned to the US. He was awarded with many military honours.

The Hotline Agreement was formed, leading to the Moscow-Washington hotline. This was a allowed the leaders of both countries to contact each other directly via the telephone, should such a crisis happen again. It is still in use today.

After witnessing such a crisis, Kennedy realised how nuclear weapons could threaten the world. As such, he set up the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), also known as the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) or Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (NTBT). The treaty prohibited all tests of nuclear weapons except underground. This sparked a chain of treaties regarding bans on nuclear weapons testing, namely the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968 and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996.

What is the importance of the Cuban Missile Crisis in the Cold War?


It had demonstrated to Kennedy, Khrushchev and the world how dangerous it could get when the destructive potential of nuclear weapons fell into the hands of humans – aggressive, indecisive, illogical and most importantly, imperfect. A weapon that could wipe everything off the face of the earth combined with humans that dared to use it was a very hairy situation. Nuclear weapons let the world know that there would be no winners in a nuclear war (mutually assured destruction), especially one based on a power struggle. Only through peaceful negotiations can the crisis of a nuclear war be averted.

References :
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuba_Missile_Crisis
All messages between Kennedy and Khrushchev :
http://www.jfklibrary.org/jfkl/cmc/cmc_correspondence.html